

POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS

April 2004

The Growth of Compstat in American Policing

By David Weisburd, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis

Introduction

Introduced as recently as 1994 by then commissioner William Bratton of the New York City Police Department, Compstat has already been recognized as a major innovation in American policing. In the few years since its appearance, police departments around the country have begun to adopt Compstat or variations of it (Law Enforcement News 1997; Maas 1998; McDonald 1998). The program has received national publicity, including awards from Harvard University and former Vice President Al Gore, and has been credited by its originators and proponents with impressive reductions in crime and improvements in neighborhood quality of life (Bratton 1999; Gurwitt 1998; Remnick 1997; Silverman, 1996).

Despite the national attention that has been paid to Compstat, to date there has been little systematic analysis of Compstat programs in policing. In fact, most of what we know comes from those involved in its implementation (Sparrow et al. 1990; Moore 1995). With support from the National Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation has tried to further our knowledge of Compstat by undertaking a national study of the program (Weisburd et al. 2001; Weisburd et al. 2003). Drawing on a representative survey of American police departments, this report examines the diffusion of Compstat and factors associated with its implementation.

The Emergence of Compstat

The particulars of Compstat's origins have been detailed elsewhere (Bratton 1998; Kelling and Coles 1996; Maple 1999; Silverman 1999; McDonald et al. 2001). The impetus behind Compstat was New York City's police commissioner William Bratton and his efforts to make a huge organization, legendary for its resistance to change (Sayre and Kaufman 1960), responsive to his leadership—a leadership that had clearly staked out crime reduction and improving the quality of life in the neighborhoods of New York City as its top priorities (Bratton 1999). Based on his belief in principles of strategic leadership (Bratton 1998; Silverman 1999) and his own

This project was supported by Grant Number 98-IJ-CX-007 by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

experiences with the Boston Police Department and the New York City Transit Police, Bratton and his lieutenants set out to disprove skeptics who claimed that the police can do little about crime and disorder.

At the outset, Bratton and his administration's analysis of the NYPD's problems revealed several deficiencies that have long been identified as forms of bureaucratic dysfunction (Merton 1940). First, the organization lacked a sense of the importance of its fundamental crime control mission. Second, because the NYPD was not setting high enough expectations about what its officers could do and accomplish, a lot less was getting done than was possible. Third, too many police managers had become moribund and were content to continue doing things the way they had always been done rather than exploring new theories and studies for promising strategies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods. Fourth, the department was beset with archaic, unproductive organizational structures that did more to promote red tape and turf battles than to facilitate teamwork to use scarce resources effectively. As a result, operational commanders were "handcuffed" by headquarters and lacked authority to customize crime control to their precincts' individual needs. Finally, the department was "flying blind". It lacked timely, accurate information about crime and public safety problems as they were emerging; had little capacity to identify crime patterns; and had difficulty tracking how its own resources were being used. Since middle managers were not in the habit of monitoring these processes, they served as a weak link in the chain of internal accountability between top brass and street-level, police employees.

Bratton used a "textbook" approach to deal with these problems, following the major prescriptions offered by organizational development experts to accomplish organizational change (Beer 1980). He brought in outsiders to obtain a candid diagnosis of the organization's strengths and weaknesses. He incorporated both top-down and bottom-up processes to implement change (Silverman 1996). He sought and obtained early indicators of the success of the change efforts and sought ways to reinforce the individual efforts of his precinct commanders and the rank-and-file by using both incentives and disincentives (Bratton 1996).

Strictly speaking, Compstat refers to a "strategic control system" developed to gather and disseminate information on the NYPD's crime problems and to track efforts to deal with them. As such, it addresses the problem of inadequate information described above and, in this sense, it is a structure intended to serve the implementation of the NYPD's crime-control and quality-of-life strategies (Office of Management Analysis and Planning n.d.: 1). At the same time, Compstat has become shorthand for the full range of strategic, problem-solving activities in the NYPD. These elements of the department's Compstat approach are most visible in the twice-weekly Compstat "Crime-Control Strategy Meetings," where precinct commanders appear before several of the department's top brass to report on crime problems in their precincts and what they are doing about them.

This occurs in a data-saturated environment in which Compstat reports play a central role. Precinct crime statistics and other information about a precinct and its problems are projected onto overhead screens, and commanders respond to queries about what they are doing to deal with those problems. Crime data that were once three to six months late are now available to precinct commanders on a weekly basis for the preceding week. The report includes weekly, monthly, and annual tallies of crime complaints, arrests, summonses, shooting incidents and victims, organized by precinct, borough, and citywide. In addition, electronic pin maps are generated to show how crimes and police activities cluster geographically. Hour-of-the-day analyses and “crime spike” analyses are also carried out. The reports also profile the background of the precinct commander, as well as other features of the precinct under his or her command, such as demographic data, workload data, and various activities.

Compstat reports serve as the database for commanders to demonstrate their understanding of the crime problems in their areas and discuss future strategies with the top brass and other commanders present. Cross-unit coordination is planned if necessary and all of the plans are thoroughly documented. When the precinct is reselected for participation in a Compstat meeting, the commander must demonstrate that he or she has followed up on these strategies. Sometimes commanders bring subordinates with them so that they can report on their efforts and receive recognition. The press and other outside agencies are sometimes invited to attend these sessions with as many as 200 people in attendance, thus providing “great theater” and developing a greater public awareness of how the department is being managed (Bratton 1998, 296).

There are indicators that police leaders around the nation are interested in and willing to explore Compstat but we do not know how widely Compstat models have diffused across the United States or what types of departments are most likely to develop Compstat programs. Why are American police departments adopting the Compstat model? Below we present answers to these questions based on our national survey of police agencies.

Research Methods

We sent our survey to all American police agencies with over 100 sworn police officers and to a sample of 100 agencies with between 50 and 100 sworn officers (see Weisburd et al. 2001).¹ The full universe of larger departments was sampled because we believed that Compstat programs are most appealing to such departments and thus most likely to be implemented in them. We thought it important, nevertheless, to assess whether smaller agencies are also beginning to develop Compstat-like programs. It would have been prohibitively costly to survey all smaller agencies, but our random sample of agencies with 50-99 officers allows us to assess whether Compstat programs are also influencing smaller departments. We decided not to sample from among departments with fewer than 50 full-time, sworn officers because we thought it

1. Our instrument was reviewed by a group of academics and practitioners including Eli Silverman, Edward Maguire, Richard Ritti, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Roger Parks, Scott Keeter, Frank Gajewski, Christopher Tutko, and Thomas Frazier.

reasonable to assume that such police agencies lack the resources and organizational complexity to implement Compstat.

At the time of our sample selection in 1999, the most complete, current listing of American police agencies was the 1996 Directory Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) which gave us both the file and its documentation (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998)². According to the directory, there were 515 agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, and 698 agencies with 50-99 officers. We sent the survey instrument by mail to all of the 515 largest agencies and a random sample of 100 agencies with between 50 and 99 officers.³ This mailing included a letter asking the chief to complete (or to delegate to a person who could reflect his/her views) the part of the survey relevant to overall departmental policy and someone familiar with technology to complete those sections of the survey.⁴ We assured the departments of complete confidentiality and included a survey instrument with a unique identification number affixed and a stamped, addressed, return envelope. We followed up with a series of phone calls as well as a second and third mailing. The first mailing occurred on August 18, 1999, and the final surveys were received in January of 2000. The overall response rate of 86 percent achieved using this method was very high for a mail survey (see Table 1).

Table 1. Response Rate for the Sample

DEPARTMENT SIZE	RECEIVED/TOTAL	PERCENT
Small (50-99 Sworn)	85/100	85
Large (100 + Sworn)	445/515	86.4
Total	530/615	86.2

We found no systematic reasons for non-response by selected departments. We received about the same proportion of responses from larger departments as from smaller ones (see Table 1). Moreover, there are relatively small differences in our response rate across regions (see Table 2), though departments in the South and West were somewhat more likely to return the survey. When we compare the distribution of our sample in terms of size of department to the BJS Directory Survey in 2000 we find that our sample is representative of the population of police agencies in the United States (see Figure 1).⁵

2. We thank Edward Maguire for his assistance in the selection of the study sample.

3. We conducted a pretest in fifteen departments—five small and ten large.


4. Part I of the survey was filled out by the chief executive officer (i.e., chief, director, superintendent, or commissioner) in half of the departments.

5. The slight underrepresentation of the larger departments might be due to the increase in sworn officers that resulted from the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 program to hire more police on the street.

Table 2. Department Response Rate by Region⁶

REGION	RECEIVED/TOTAL	PERCENT
Northeast	119/146	81.5
North Central	102/122	83.6
South	192/215	89.3
West	117/132	88.6

Figure 1. Percent of Departments of a Certain Size in the Sample as Contrasted with the BJS Directory Survey



6. The Northeastern region includes the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The North Central region includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. And the Western region includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

How Widely Has Compstat Been Adopted and What Types of Departments Are Implementing Compstat?

Our first concern is simply whether Compstat models have been adopted widely across American police agencies. This has been the impression of commentators but has not been backed up with hard evidence. Our study suggests that Compstat has in fact diffused widely across the landscape of American policing (see Table 3).⁷ A third of departments with 100 or more sworn officers in our study responded “yes” when asked whether they had “implemented a Compstat-like program.”⁸ An additional quarter of the large departments in our survey claimed to be “planning” a Compstat-like program. As we expected, departments in our small department sample were much less likely to have implemented a Compstat model. Only nine departments or 11 percent of the departments with between 50 and 99 sworn officers had done so. However, almost 30 percent claimed to be planning to implement a Compstat program. Because the number of departments in our sample with between 50 and 99 sworn officers that have implemented a Compstat model is small, unless otherwise noted in the tables below, we examine characteristics of Compstat in the large department sample only.

Table 3. Has Your Department Implemented a Compstat-Like Program?

DEPARTMENT SIZE	Percent Yes	Percent No, But Planning	Percent No
Small (50-99 Sworn)	11.0	29.3	59.8
Large (100 + Sworn)	32.6	25.6	41.8


Due to rounding, rows may not add to 100.

We also asked departments when their Compstat program was implemented. As would be expected, the large growth in implementation of Compstat programs occurs after New York’s program had begun to gain wide-scale publicity (see Figure 2). Compstat implementation was greatest in 1998. The downward trend in 1999 may be an artifact of our study, since some departments who responded quickly to our survey may have implemented a Compstat program later in that year.

7. To simplify interpretation, we generally do not report the N of cases in the tables that follow. Overall, there were very few missing values associated with the items in the survey (mean=2.7%).

8. This question followed a section of the survey that provided a list of eleven “features that have been associated with Compstat and similar programs instituted in other departments.”

Figure 2. The Year of Compstat Implementation




Interestingly, eighteen departments in our large agency sample report implementation before 1994, the year the NYPD introduced Compstat. How could departments claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program before New York City coined the term? It appears that in such cases, departments believed that they had implemented the essential elements of Compstat even before New York City's model had become prominent. This is illustrated in Table 4 which reports the percentage of departments that claimed to have implemented specific features "associated with Compstat and similar programs" at least six years before the survey, a time that predates the creation of Compstat in New York City. Twenty-six percent of departments said that they "set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured" or that they held "regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives." Thirty percent report using data to "assess progress towards objectives" before 1994.

Table 4. Was This Feature (of Compstat) Implemented Six or More Years Ago?

Survey Item	Percent Yes
Set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured	26.0
Hold regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives	26.3
Hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them	22.7
Give middle managers control over more resources to accomplish objectives	23.1
Use data to assess progress toward objectives	30.2
Develop, modify, or discard problem-solving strategies based on what the data show	24.8

Our survey shows that larger American police agencies claim to have adopted Compstat at a high rate and very rapidly. How does this compare with the adoption of other social or technological innovations? In recent years, there has been growing interest in the analysis of innovation which has been found to have a fairly consistent form called the “s” curve of innovation (Rogers, 1995). The “s” curve is developed by measuring the cumulative adoption of an innovation over time. In Figure 3, the innovation adoption curve for Compstat-like programs in police agencies with over 100 sworn officers is presented.

Figure 3. Observed Compstat Cumulative Adoption Curve Based on Survey Findings




Can we argue from this that the diffusion of Compstat-like programs suggests a rapid rate of innovation? Arnulf Grübler (1991) provides a yardstick. He analyzes two samples of technologies, including such areas as energy, transport, communication, agriculture, military technologies, as well as some social changes such as literacy, in the United States for which data on diffusion of innovation were available. He constructs a measure, delta t, which is the time period it takes for an innovation to go from 10 percent to 90 percent of its saturation or highest level of adoption. He finds that between 13 and 25 percent of different types of technology progress from 10 percent to 90 percent of their saturation level within fifteen years. Another 25 to 30 percent of his samples reached this saturation level in thirty years.

Calculation of the delta t precisely for a Compstat-like program is not possible before the saturation process is complete. However, we can estimate the cumulative adoption curve using the data available from our survey. Rogers (1995, 257) notes that the adoption of an innovation generally “follows a normal bell-shaped curve” when plotted over time as a frequency distribution. In Figure 4, we develop a cumulative adoption curve based on this assumption extrapolating from our observed data.⁹ Based on this distribution and allowing saturation to include all police departments in our sample, we estimate a 90 percent saturation level between

⁹ In estimating the normal frequency distribution upon which the s curve is based, we relied upon the observed data between 1995 and 1998. We excluded 1999 because of the timing of the survey, which likely underrepresented the number of adoptions. We also excluded years before 1995 because the number of cases were relatively small and likely to lead to unstable estimates. In developing an estimated value for the standard deviation unit of the normal curve, we compared each year’s frequency between 1995 and 1998 and then took the average estimate gained. After defining the normal frequency distribution, we then converted the estimates to a cumulative distribution curve.

2006 and 2007. As a 10 percent saturation using the observed data was defined as occurring between 1996 and 1997, our estimate of Δt is about ten years. Accordingly, if the adoption of Compstat-like programs were to follow the growth patterns observed in our data, Compstat would rank among the most quickly diffused forms of innovation.


Figure 4. The Extrapolated Cumulative Adoption Curve for Compstat-like Programs



The Role of the New York Police Department in the Diffusion of Compstat-like Programs

While a number of departments claim to have implemented elements of Compstat before New York formally introduced this model, the influence of the New York Police Department and its centrality in the diffusion of Compstat models is reflected in the large number of police agencies that came to New York to learn about Compstat (see Figure 5). An overwhelming number of departments who observed a Compstat meeting or department did so at the NYPD. While departments that have implemented Compstat-like programs have also visited Los Angeles, New Orleans, or Broward County, Florida, all places that have well publicized Compstat programs, New York is clearly the site where most police agencies go to learn about this innovation.

Figure 5. Where Compstat Departments Observed a Compstat Meeting



The profound influence of New York City's promotion of Compstat becomes even more apparent when considering the level of familiarity the surveyed departments claim to have with New York City's Compstat program. Table 5 shows that fully 40 percent of the smallest agencies that had not implemented a Compstat-like program considered themselves very or somewhat familiar with the NYPD's program. The percentage of the non-Compstat departments claiming familiarity increases with each size category, reaching 90 percent for the largest departments. A similar pattern (albeit at higher levels) is shown for Compstat departments.


Table 5. Familiarity with the NYPD's Compstat by Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)

Number of Sworn	Percent Very or Somewhat Familiar with New York City's Compstat Program	
	Compstat-like program not implemented	Compstat-like program implemented
50-99	40.3	71.4
100-299	55.7	73.2
300-499	66.7	100.0
>500	90.3	97.6

Characteristics of Compstat Departments


The relationship between department size and the implementation of Compstat is not restricted to a broad comparison between the largest and smallest departments (as was illustrated in Table 1). As Figure 6 illustrates, there is a direct linear relationship between Compstat programs and department size across our sample. Almost 60 percent of departments with 500 or more sworn officers claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program. Forty-four percent of departments with between 300 and 499 sworn officers, and 31 percent of departments with between 200 and 299 sworn, say that they have established a Compstat-like program. This relationship between department size and implementation of a Compstat-like program is strong and statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Figure 6. Implementation of Compstat and Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)



We also find a statistically significant relationship of $p < .05$ between geographic region and implementation of Compstat-like programs (see Figure 7), though the relationship is not as strong as that of size of department. Over 40 percent of the departments with over 100 sworn officers in the South have implemented Compstat. This can be contrasted with the Northeast where only 26 percent of departments claim that they have implemented a Compstat-like program. We think that this distribution reflects a more general phenomenon in American policing over the last decade. While innovation, as in the case of Compstat, may begin in older police agencies in the East or Central regions of the country, police agencies in the South and West are, on average, more willing or perhaps more able to adopt those innovations.

Figure 7. Compstat Departments by Region



Motivations for Adopting Compstat

While the survey did not ask respondents to indicate directly the motivations or priorities that led to the implementation of Compstat, it affords an opportunity to observe patterns from which we might infer such motivations. Respondents were asked to rank the top five goals that the chief executive pursued in the previous twelve months, selecting from a list of nineteen.¹⁰ We

10. The nineteen goals in the order listed were: reduce serious crime; reduce quality of life offenses; reduce fear of crime; reduce calls for service; increase citizen satisfaction with the police; increase service to citizens living in high-crime areas; increase efficiency of service (reduce cost per unit of service); reduce conflict among different segments of the community; increase citizen participation in police programs; increase citizens' ability to make their own neighborhoods better places to live; give citizen groups more influence over police policy and practice; improve coordination with other public and private organizations; reduce complaints about police misbehavior; increase

assigned a score of five to the top goal identified by each respondent, a four to the second ranking goal and so on, giving all unranked goals a score of zero. Because we wanted to examine priorities of departments close to when they implemented a Compstat program we excluded all departments that had implemented Compstat before 1998. We compare these departments with those that stated in the survey that they had not implemented a Compstat-like program and they were not planning to do so.

The average ranking for the nineteen goals was .78 for the large department sample. Only four of the nineteen items showed a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) between the two groups of departments (see Table 6). Accordingly, there is a good deal of consensus in these police agencies regarding the priority goals for policing. However, departments that had recently implemented Compstat tended to rank the reduction of serious crime and increasing management control over field operations substantially higher than departments that were not planning implementation of Compstat. Departments that were not planning to implement a Compstat-like program tended to score much higher than departments that claimed to recently have adopted Compstat on the ranks they assigned to improving officer policing skills and employee morale.

Table 6. Comparing Top Goals of Compstat Departments (pre-1998 implementation) with Departments Not Planning to Implement Compstat: Statistically Significant Differences

	Average Rank of Goal	
	Compstat-like program implemented after 1997 (n=79)	Not planning implementation (n=178)
Reduce serious crime	3.32	2.26
Increase police managers' control over field operations	.91	.44
Improve officers' policing skills	.46	.96
Improve employee morale	.28	.68

Departments that had recently implemented Compstat gave the reduction of serious crime a priority ranking 1.5 (3.32/2.26) times that of departments not planning to implement Compstat, and increasing management control a ranking of 2.1 (.91/.44) times that of such departments. Similarly, though in reverse, departments not planning to implement Compstat gave priority rankings to improving police officer skills that were on average 2.1 (.96/.46) times those of agencies that had claimed to recently implemented a Compstat-like program, and priority

police managers' control over actual field operations; improve officers' policing skills; improve employee morale; be more responsive to the priorities of individual neighborhoods; provide better service to crime victims; and improve the physical appearance of neighborhoods.

rankings for improving employee morale that were on average 2.4 (.68/.28) times those of such agencies. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that the dominant motivations for implementing Compstat are to secure management control over field operations that will reduce serious crime. At the same time, focus on improving skills and morale of street level officers—which, for example, have been high priorities in many community-policing programs—are relatively lower priorities for recently implemented Compstat departments.

Conclusions

Our study confirms what many police observers have noted: that Compstat has literally burst onto the American police scene. Our survey took place a few years after the development of Compstat in New York City, but it shows that police agencies throughout the United States have begun to adopt Compstat-like programs. We also find that the adoption of Compstat-like programs in police agencies follows a process of diffusion of innovation that is rapid as compared with innovations in other social and technological areas.

Our study also suggests that Compstat is being differentially implemented in police agencies. Not surprisingly, larger police agencies are more likely to adopt Compstat-like programs. We suspect that this is due to the relevance of Compstat for reinforcing management control in larger police agencies, where hierarchical control tends to be more problematic. Whatever the cause, there is a direct linear relationship in our study between the adoption of Compstat-like programs and the size of a police agency. We also find that agencies in the South and West of the country have been more likely to adopt Compstat-like programs, suggesting in our view the more general level of innovation found in agencies in these parts of the country.

The specific motivations for adopting Compstat vary across police agencies, but we found that the model of Compstat that has been touted in New York City has strongly influenced its adoption elsewhere in the country. Moreover, our study shows that the adoption of Compstat is strongly related to a department's expressed desire to reduce serious crime and increase management control over field operations. These goals for policing are much more prominent in agencies that have adopted Compstat than those that have not. At the same time, we found that agencies that had adopted Compstat programs are much less likely to focus on improving skills and morale of street-level officers. This suggests that Compstat may represent not only a new movement in police efforts to develop effective crime-control strategies, but also a departure from the priorities of "bubble-up" community-policing programs that rely on initiative from street-level officers.

REFERENCES

- Beer, Michael 1980. *Organizational Change and Development: A Systems View*. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company.
- Bratton, William J. 1999. Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime. In *Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings*, ed. Robert H. Langworthy, 11-26. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Bratton, William J. 1998. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House.
- Bratton, William J. 1996. Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest. *Heritage Foundation Policy and Research Analysis*, lecture no. 573, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/HL573.cfm>.
- Grubler, Arnulf. 1991. Diffusion and Long-Term Patterns and Discontinuities. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 39:159-180.
- Gurwitt, Rob. 1998. The Comeback of the Cops. *Governing* (January): 14-19.
- Kelling, George L., and William J. Bratton. 1998. Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New York City Story. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 88: 1217-1232.
- Kelling, George L., and Catherine M. Coles. 1996. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*. New York: Free Press.
- Law Enforcement News*. 1997. NYC's Compstat Continues to Win Admirers. October 13.
- Maas, Peter. 1998. What We're Learning from New York City. *Parade*, May 10.
- Maple, Jack. 1999. *The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business*. New York: Doubleday.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall, Sheldon Greenberg, and William J. Bratton. 2001. *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the NYPD Crime Control Model Using COMPSTAT*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall. 1998. *The New York City crime control model: A guide to implementation*. Unpublished manuscript. Washington, DC.

- Merton, Robert K. 1940. Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. *Social Forces* 18:560-568.
- Moore, Mark H. 1995. *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Office of Management Analysis and Planning. n.d. *The Compstat Process*. New York: New York City Police Department.
- Remnick, David. 1997. The Crime Buster. *The New Yorker*, February 24 and March 3.
- Rogers, Everett M. 1995. *Diffusion of Innovations*. New York: Free Press.
- Sayre, Wallace Stanley, and Herbert Kaufman. 1960. *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1999. *NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1996. Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Re-engineered Itself to Drive Down Crime. *Law Enforcement News*, December.
- Sparrow, Malcolm K., Mark H. Moore, and David B. Kennedy. 1990. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York: Basic Books.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1998. *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996*, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea96.htm>.
- Weisburd, David, Stephen Mastrofski, Ann Marie McNally and Rosann Greenspan. 2001. *Compstat and Organizational Change: Findings from a National Survey*. Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice by the Police Foundation.
- Weisburd, David, Stephen Mastrofski, Ann Marie McNally, Rosann Greenspan, and James Willis. 2003. Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing. *Criminology and Public Policy* 2 (3): 421-456.

About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure and works to transfer to local agencies the best information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns.

Our purpose is to help the police be more effective in doing their job, whether it is deterring robberies, intervening in potentially injurious domestic disputes, or working to improve relationships between the police and the communities they serve. To accomplish our mission, we work closely with police officers and police departments across the country, and it is in their hard work and contributions that our accomplishments are rooted.

The foundation helps police departments to acquire both the knowledge gained through research and the tools needed to integrate that knowledge into police practices. Working with law enforcement agencies seeking to improve performance, service delivery, accountability, and community satisfaction with police services, the foundation offers a wide range of services and expertise. The Crime Mapping & Problem Analysis Laboratory operates with the goals of providing practical assistance and information to police departments and to developing the physical and theoretical infrastructure necessary for further innovations in police and criminological theory.

The foundation has done much of the research that led to a questioning of the traditional model of professional law enforcement and toward a new view of policing—one emphasizing a community orientation. For example, research on foot patrol and on fear of crime demonstrated the importance to crime control efforts of frequent police-citizen contacts made in a positive, non-threatening way. As a partner in the Community Policing Consortium, the foundation, along with four other leading national law enforcement organizations, plays a principal role in the development of community policing research, training, and technical assistance.

Sometimes foundation research findings have challenged police traditions and beliefs. When police agencies employed routine preventive patrol as a principal anti-crime strategy, a foundation experiment in Kansas City showed that routine patrol in marked patrol cars did not significantly affect crime rates. When police officials expressed reservations about using women on patrol, foundation research in Washington, DC, showed that gender was not a barrier to performing patrol work. To address the intense debate about how police should respond to incidents of domestic violence, the foundation conducted the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment—the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime. Foundation research on the use of deadly force was cited at length in a landmark 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision, *Tennessee v. Garner*. The court ruled that the police may use deadly force only against persons whose actions constitute a threat to life.

Motivating all of the foundation's efforts is the goal of efficient, effective, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.



1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2636
(202) 833-1460
(202) 659-9149 fax
E-mail: pinfo@policefoundation.org
www.policefoundation.org