The Los Angeles Police Department has developed this comprehensive budgetary package to address those aspects of Department systems and operations for which additional or different budgetary resources will be necessary in order to ensure that the extremely serious and corrupt activities at Rampart Area CRASH are never allowed to recur. In order to place these requirements in perspective and to fully understand the breadth and depth of the aggressive inquiry, which culminated in these recommendations, the following background information is provided.
Events Leading Up to The Board of Inquiry
Board of Inquiry
Board of Inquiry Recommendations
Testing and Screening Police Officer Candidates
Personnel/Corruption Investigations and Management of Risk
Anti-Corruption Inspections and Audits
Job-specific Training Programs
Events Leading Up to The Board of Inquiry
In November 1997, former Officer David Mack and an accomplice robbed a Bank of America.
In February 1998, former Officer Hewitt detained, transported, choked and beat a handcuffed gang member.
In March 1998, former Officer Rafael Perez, using another officer’s identity, stole three kilos of cocaine from Property Division. Ultimately, an investigation led to identification of Rafael Perez as the thief.
After one mistrial in the prosecution of Perez and more investigation, which uncovered evidence of additional illegal activity, Perez decided to cooperate with investigators in laying out the full range of illegal and corrupt activities involving himself and others.
In September 1999, after the extent of corruption and illegal activities became known, including allegations of perjury and fabrication of cases against innocent parties, a Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened to determine how these activities could have been allowed to occur and to recommend measures to prevent future problems.
It is important to note that the Department originally uncovered the illegal activity and has continued to aggressively pursue the investigation and prosecution of the corrupt employees. To this end, a task force of highly experienced investigators was formed under the management of Operations-Headquarters Bureau to pursue this massive criminal investigation to its ultimate ends. It is anticipated that this investigation will continue for some time to come. Other lesser misconduct will be handled by Internal Affairs Division. These activities are totally separate and apart from the purpose and activities of the BOI, which was convened to determine how this corrupt and illegal activity could have been allowed to occur and to recommend measures for ensuring such extensive corrupt behavior is never allowed to recur.
The BOI working groups and subcommittees focused on the following areas:
Profiles of several officers were developed, including a review of their pre-employment backgrounds, selection process, personnel complaints, uses of force, work permits, litigation history and other work history.
An extensive analysis of the work products of Rampart CRASH unit officers, other CRASH units and other specialized units and divisions throughout the Department.
Examination of the supervision and management of Rampart Area over the years, their performance and the effectiveness of corruption prevention and detection systems.
Analyses of risk management factors such as personnel complaints, uses of force, pursuits, and grievances.
Review of the Department’s operations systems, including our existing management and organizational structure for operational bureaus and Areas. Systems examined included property booking, arrestee booking and report approval, search warrant review, informant control, performance evaluation, training, deployment, and management controls and audits.
Examination of the current methods by which non-disciplinary administrative investigations are conducted and reviewed by management and how they compare with Department standards. Particular focus was placed on uses of force, vehicular pursuits and fleet safety investigations and the audit and review mechanisms to ensure their credibility.
Examination of the manner in which Officer-Involved Shootings (OIS) are investigated, supervisory and management response and oversight, the role of Scientific Investigation Division, “best practices” in the profession and any appropriate changes to the Department’s OIS Investigation Protocols.
Exploration of suitable protocols for handling major personnel investigations, including corruption incidents.
Review of existing LAPD integrity assurance systems, existing training in integrity and ethics, hiring and screening practices, exploration of “best practices” within the profession for ensuring integrity and outreach to gain external stakeholder input and recommendations on integrity issues.
In the course of conducting this BOI, literally tens of thousands of documents were examined and hundreds of interviews conducted. Some aspects of these examinations will continue, as will the separate criminal investigation by the task force. However, the root causes of the failure have been adequately identified. These failures and their causes cannot be viewed as one time or episodic events for which the Department and the City can “close the books” any more than they can “close the books” on the civil liability which will continue to flow from these failures. These terrible events have forever changed the Department and the City. Measures must be undertaken and resources put in place to ensure that for as far as anyone can see into the future, there are no recurrences.
The following are those steps that must be taken, and they must be given the most significant and highest budgetary priority. Because of the scope of these requirements, it is planned to phase them in over a five-year period. With the exception of upgrades of existing positions (for example, upgrade of supervisors assigned to CRASH units from Sergeant I to Sergeant II), all sworn positions are requested as upgrades of existing Police Officer II positions. In most instances, they do not represent removal of sworn personnel from the field, but rather upgrades to existing positions in order to attract the most experienced personnel and stabilize their assignments to sensitive and high-risk positions. In the case of increased personnel for Internal Affairs Group (IAG), many of the positions will be allocated to allow more thorough and independent investigation of the more significant community-initiated complaints. Since many of these investigations, by necessity, are now conducted by the divisions themselves, it is merely shifting the workload to IAG, freeing up divisional supervisory personnel to engage in other vital supervisory duties.
The issue cannot be the cost of these measures. Without implementation of these measures and the more than 100 other operational policy and procedural changes recommended by the BOI, it is not a question of “if” but “when” these deplorable circumstances would recur. The City and the Department simply cannot afford to avoid these measures. The community deserves no less.
In reviewing the Rampart corruption incident, it is clear that oversight systems must be reestablished and reinforced to prevent and detect similar patterns and activities should they occur in the future. To that end, the Police Department has developed a five-year plan, with implementation beginning in FY 00/01, to reestablish those critical controls. The following report discusses the staff increases and other essential funding needs that will enable the Department to ensure there is never a repeat of the Rampart corruption scandal. The report is organized by the following areas of concern:
Testing and screening police officer candidates;
Personnel/corruption investigations and management of risk;
Anti-corruption inspections and audits; and
Job-specific training programs.
The above areas of concern are not prioritized. They are all considered critical to the Department’s five-year plan. Each area of concern includes at least one recommendation that must be implemented in FY 00/01; the Department’s priority for each FY 00/01 recommendation is indicated. A synopsis of the recommendations in priority order is included as Attachment 1. To permit easy reference, the page number where the recommendation is discussed in detail is included with the synopsis. A cost breakdown for each priority is included as Attachment 2.
Since this document represents a five-year plan, staffing recommendations for Fiscal Years 01/02 through 04/05 are also included (Attachment 3). These recommendations are not prioritized.
The single best time to prevent future liability and corruption is during the personnel selection process. In reviewing the Department’s testing and screening of police officer candidates, the BOI found that pre-employment information on several of the officers it reviewed raises serious issues regarding their initial employment. Criminal records, the inability to manage personal finances, histories of violent behavior and narcotics involvement are all factors that should preclude employment as police officers for the City of Los Angeles. However, the reality is that these factors did not disqualify several of these officers, two of whom have now been fired or resigned following felony convictions and a third fired after beating a handcuffed arrestee. Clearly, our testing and screening standards must be improved to prevent future occurrences.
Priority 1 – FY 00/01
The LAPD is one of the few agencies that does not polygraph all police candidates at some point in the hiring process. At the recent International Association of Chiefs of Police convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, a seminar on maintaining an ethical atmosphere in law enforcement stressed as one of the highest priority measures the administration of pre-employment polygraphs to police candidates. Polygraph examinations, with a particular emphasis on drug use and integrity issues, should be administered routinely to all police officer candidates prior to conducting their background investigation. The cost associated with this effort will undoubtedly be offset by the reduced costs associated with disciplinary and litigation processes generated by problem officers. This will require the addition of staff and equipment in the Scientific Investigation Division (SID) Polygraph Section. Because of the absence of an adequate outside candidate pool, it will be necessary to train sworn personnel (Detectives) to perform these polygraph examinations. One examiner can perform approximately 300 examinations per year; approximately 2,000 examinations will be performed by the Detectives each year. One Polygraph Examiner III is also required for quality assurance and to conduct the more difficult examinations. Two Police Surveillance Specialists (formerly Communications Electricians) are required to operate and maintain recording equipment. The following FY 00/01 staffing needs have been identified:
1 – Detective III
6 – Detectives II
1 – Polygraph Examiner III
2 – Police Surveillance Specialists
Specialized equipment items
Priority 2 – FY 00/01
We must contract with an outside vendor to provide public information on candidates, particularly those from out of state. Private vendors have access to a multitude of public information databases, including court records, licenses and various other public documents. The cost for this service will vary depending upon the type of data requested and the speed with which the information is required. We could try to have this access “in house” but that would require maintaining a variety of subscriptions and training people in their use. It is more cost effective to simply contract for the service. It is estimated that these checks will be made on about 250 candidates per year at a cost of about $100 per check, for a total annual cost of $25,000; however, the cost can only be determined after the contract is put out for bid.
Priority 3 – FY 00/01
Utilize the services of retired police officers residing throughout the country (and world, if necessary) as occasional contract investigators, under the classification of Interview Specialist, to ensure that thorough background investigations are conducted. The information obtained from in-person interviews greatly outweighs any costs associated with such a program and the reduced wages and travel expenses make the use of out of state investigators extremely cost effective. The estimated cost for this service is $90,000 annually.
The BOI’s work focused time and again on the Department’s personnel practices. Some of the identified problems resulted from a failure to follow well-established procedures, but others will require shoring up those systems.
Priorities 10 and 11 – FY 00/01
The BOI found that one major factor contributing to the Rampart CRASH scandal was the relative youth and inexperience of the officers who migrated through CRASH. Geographic Area specialized units, such as CRASH and Special Problems Units (SPU), will be consolidated into Area Specialized Enforcement Sections. These units are important to the accomplishment of the Department’s crime control mission and, except perhaps for SWAT and some narcotics operations, are among the most sensitive and risky of Department operations. Yet we staff these units with the basic ranks and all too often fill many of those positions with officers barely off probation. Only tenured supervisors and officers should be selected for these specialized assignments. The Department proposes upgrading all Sergeant I positions to Sergeant II to ensure the positions are filled by the most qualified and experienced personnel. The Department also proposes upgrading one-half of the Police Officers II assigned to these positions to Police Officer III. This will allow for the deployment of POIII/POII teams in these critical assignments. Upgrades of these Police Officer II positions will not be automatic, but will be an arduous process to select the best qualified personnel. The pairing of a seasoned field officer with a less-experienced officer is felt to be a reasonable balance between cost and risk management.
36 – Sergeant II upgrades of Sergeant I supervisors assigned to Area CRASH and SPU units (Priority 10).
268 – Police Officer III upgrades of one-half of the 535 Police Officers II assigned to CRASH/SPU (Priority 11).
Priorities 14 and 15 – FY 00/01
Upgrade of Sergeant I positions assigned to Area Youth Services Offices (YSO) to Sergeant II and upgrade of Police Officer II YSO positions to Police Officer III are also requested. These upgrades will stabilize the positions and attract the most mature and qualified personnel, thereby limiting liability that has periodically occurred and resulted in serious embarrassment and costly lawsuit settlements.
18 – Sergeant II upgrades of Sergeant I YSO supervisors (Priority 14).
36 – Police Officers III to upgrade all geographic Area Police Officer II Youth Services Officers (Priority 15).
Data capture and input infrastructure for the Training, Evaluation and Management System (TEAMS) must be improved. It is imperative that TEAMS accurately reflect the current status of this critical information. To place a cost figure on this work, the Department’s Information and Communications Services Bureau along with the Information Technology Agency will need to evaluate the system’s shortcomings. It is possible that technical revisions already in progress will solve identified problems.
We must make the Position Tracking System (PTS) useable and expand its capability to include tracking Administrative Transfers, personnel who cannot be assigned to certain workplaces (because of past complaint histories, litigation, relatives and former relatives working the same entity) and other critical personnel issues which affect personnel movement within the Department. Functional specifications must be developed prior to conducting a technical analysis from which cost figures can be obtained. It is anticipated that this process will consume most if not all of Fiscal Year 2000/2001.
Time and again, the BOI found patterns of misconduct at the unit and individual employee level that went undetected. If detected early enough major abuse of power and civil liability could have been averted. We simply must build the Department’s ability to look at these critical risk-management factors in a broad, Department-wide sense if we are to identify patterns and prevent a recurrence of the Rampart scandal. Further, the BOI found that too many significant personnel investigations were assigned to patrol supervisors rather than to Internal Affairs Group (IAG) investigators. Many of those complaints involved serious community complaints that should have been handled by IAG to ensure the most independent and thorough investigation possible. Further, we must develop the capacity to investigate corruption incidents, including the use of proactive measures to ferret out potential corruption.
Modifications to the existing protocol for handling major personnel investigations would improve case management, assure the technical and procedural quality of investigations, improve logistical support for future investigations, and create an archive of self-critical analyses for consideration in future investigations.
Priority 4 – FY 00/01
Increasing IAG by 200 sworn and civilian staff is required over the next five fiscal years to accomplish the Department’s objectives. Forty of these staff are required in FY 00/01.
Internal Affairs Group must be expanded to ensure that IAG investigates all but minor community complaints and to enhance IAG’s ability to ensure the integrity of the investigations conducted by IAG and other Department entities. In particular, IAG’s Review and Evaluation Unit must be increased in order to review taped interviews and compare them with the written synopsis of the interview submitted with the complaint for adjudication.
An Ethics Enforcement Section should be established within IAG. This Section should be given the logistical tools, as well as the personnel resources, to continually conduct sting operations to find and root out corruption. Carefully thought out protocols will be required for these sensitive operations. The single most important lesson learned from other police departments’ corruption scandals is the need for an aggressive anti-corruption program. The Department and IAG do a good job responding to corruption incidents, but we must now do an equally good job trying to find corrupt behavior within the ranks of the LAPD before it reaches epidemic or scandal proportions.
The Special Operations Section (SOS), IAG, should be responsible for conducting corruption investigations involving Department employees. This will require that SOS be expanded and enhanced to handle large, complex and high profile corruption investigations.
The entity responsible for investigating a corruption case should be located away from City facilities so it can conduct its business in relative confidentiality. To avoid security breaches, the Department must have the ability to acquire off-site office space and supporting equipment without leaving the paper trail required by the City’s normal process. Preliminarily, it would seem the existing Secret Service fund may be appropriate for this purpose. If existing Secret Service funds are insufficient, the Department will contact key elected officials to request additional funds.
The following FY 00/01 IAG staffing needs have been identified. Section/Unit assignments for the requested staff are included as Attachment 4.
2 – Lieutenants II
4 – Detectives III
1 – Senior Management Analyst II
4 – Detectives II
23 – Sergeants II
1 – Principal Clerk Police II
5 – Senior Clerk Typists
2 – Police Surveillance Specialists (to be assigned to SID) to conduct the technical aspects of integrity assurance surveillances.
Related surveillance equipment
IAG Staffing Increments – Fiscal Years 01/02 through 04/05:
1 – Detective III
36 – Sergeants II
3 – Senior Clerk Typists
6 – Detectives III
7 – Detectives II
25 – Sergeants II
1 – Police Officer II
1 – Senior Clerk Typist
7 – Detectives II
31 – Sergeants II
2 – Senior Clerk Typists
5 – Detectives II
30 – Sergeants II
5 – Senior Clerk Typists
Priority 5 – FY 00/01
The BOI found significant disparity in the application of policy and procedure in the administrative review of uses of force, pursuits and traffic collisions and failure to recognize alarming trends. Risk Management Division (RMD) staffing must be increased so staff can develop a system to monitor and track our critical risk management factors and provide managers with regular broad-based analysis of those trends to facilitate effective management oversight. This would include our four primary areas of risk management: use of force; personnel complaints; pursuits; and traffic collisions. It would also include a tracking system and analysis of individuals, work groups, commands and bureaus with high or unusual patterns in these areas. The following RMD staffing needs have been identified.
1- Lieutenant II
5 – Sergeants II
4 – Sergeants I
3 – Management Analysts II
1- Clerk Typist
Additional Staffing Needs
Fiscal Year 01/02
One additional Commander position should be added to Human Resources Bureau (HRB) to assume full-time responsibility for the Department’s risk management program. Through RMD, this staff officer would be responsible for administering a proactive risk management program, including monitoring potential problem officers and entities with unusual patterns of risk-management behaviors. This staff officer would also be the final review authority for all the Department’s administrative investigations that are not handled through IAG, e.g., use of force, traffic collisions and pursuits. That responsibility would include reviewing all completed reports for consistency and accuracy, reconciling any classification disagreements, monitoring corrective actions, and retaining the original investigative report. This Commander position will also require support positions of one Sergeant II (aide) and one Secretary.
1 – Commander
1 – Sergeant II
1 – Secretary
We simply must build a better Department infrastructure to allow sufficient time for proactive supervision and sufficient management personnel to perform essential leadership and oversight functions. Finally, we must create a system of performance measures, both for individuals and work groups, which set organizational standards and allow us to identify potential problems before they get out of hand.
Priority 6 – FY 00/01
We must return to the formula of providing one field sergeant for every seven patrol officers (1:7) rather than the 1:8 formula imposed several years ago. The BOI concluded the lack of effective field supervision in Rampart was, frankly, glaring. To be effective, they must be in the field where incidents occur. We simply must ensure there are sufficient field supervisors to perform the basic supervision and leadership functions necessary to prevent future corruption incidents. New programs such as FASTRAC, the complaint process, and the Ideal Basic Car and Ideal Area are critical to our future success. These were implemented after most of the Rampart corruption activity occurred; but they certainly will reduce proactive field supervisory time even further. The following FY 00/01 staffing needs have been identified:
73 – Sergeants I to create a 1:7 ratio for patrol.
6 – Sergeants I+II to create a 1:7 ratio for motor officers.
Priority 9 – FY 00/01
The facts surrounding some critical field incidents, including a few officer-involved shootings (OIS’s), have come under serious question. If we are to ensure the investigative integrity of our OIS and other major crime scenes, we must ensure that trained detectives respond 24-hours a day, seven days a week to take control of the crime scene and all witnesses. This will require that we reinstitute “K-cars” out of Detective Headquarters Division (DHD) and require their response to all OIS, homicide and other major crime scenes to “freeze” those scenes and ensure evidence and witnesses are preserved, and then provide assistance to RHD or any other entity responsible for the investigation. This will require the following additional staffing within DHD:
1- Lieutenant II
1 – Detective III
16 – Detectives II
8 – Detectives I
3 – Police Officers II
1 – Senior Clerk Typist
Priority 13 – FY 00/01
The BOI has recommended that measures be taken to complete firearms analysis in a more timely manner to facilitate more timely completion of the entire OIS investigation and timely review by the Use of Force Review Board, the Chief of Police and the Police Commission. It is critical that we place a high priority on the scientific analysis of evidence seized during OIS investigations. If the analysis of that critical information is to be available in a timely manner, we simply must improve our ability to complete OIS firearms examinations expeditiously without sacrificing our responsiveness to other criminal cases. This will require the hiring of additional Firearms Examiners and Forensic Print Specialists within Scientific Investigation Division.
1 – Criminalist III
2 – Criminalists II
2 – Forensic Print Specialists III
Additional Staffing Needs – FY 01/02
Civilianization of geographic Area adjutant positions has failed. These critical positions must be returned to Sergeant II authorities. Adjutants do much more than simply control and process paperwork. Their main function is to sift through the large volume of paperwork generated daily in an operational command and bring important matters to the commanding officer’s attention. The ability to recognize those critical issues simply requires that Area adjutants have sworn supervisory experience. We recognize that some Management Analyst adjutants have been very successful, but those generally have been “career” Police Department employees. Unfortunately, these career civilian employees are scarce today and training cannot substitute for experience when it comes to recognizing police issues and subtle patterns before they become major problems.
18 – Management Analyst II positions reallocated to Sergeant II
As a result of the City Administrative Officer’s 1984 audit, Lieutenant II positions that headed the Department’s CRO units were eliminated. The recent implementation of the Ideal Area eliminated an entire layer of Area management, allowing the three patrol watch commanders to report directly to the Area commanding officer. This substantially increased the Area commanding officer’s responsibilities, which was to be compensated for by establishing the position of Administrative Lieutenant; although a lower paygrade, the Administrative Lieutenant positions encompassed and expanded the functions of the previous CRO Lieutenant II positions (i.e., coordinating and supervising community-related programs such as the Community Police Academy, community relations programs, Explorer Scout Post and Area Reserve Corps). Additionally, most tenured Lieutenants I seek upgrade to Lieutenant II positions; assigning the base paygrade to critical Area Administrative Lieutenant positions tends to ensure that they are filled with less experienced employees. Upgrading these positions to Lieutenant II will attract the more senior Lieutenants to these positions and ensure that Lieutenants with the proper skills and experience are performing those critical Area functions.
18 – Lieutenant II upgrades of Lieutenant I Area Administrative Lieutenant positions.
The BOI examined past investigative practices involving OIS’s and determined that all OIS’s should be investigated by Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD). This will ensure that detectives with the requisite experience and tenure handle all aspects of these complex and sometimes volatile investigations, including the complete criminal investigation into the suspect’s actions. The following FY 01/02 staffing increases within RHD have been identified:
6 – Detectives III
6 – Detectives II
Clearly, there has been serious erosion in the quality and emphasis of audits and inspections over the years. The BOI concluded that this oversight erosion helped create the opportunity for corruption to flourish. If we are to ensure that employees follow the rules and comply with our standards, we must embark on an aggressive system of audits and inspections. These efforts must ensure that individual work is completed up to standards and that work done in high-risk areas is inspected regularly to identify trends and potential problems early. It was interesting to note that every vice unit inspected was virtually error free. After several corruption incidents in the 1950s and 1960s, a virtually “bulletproof” system of checks and balances at the Divisional, Bureau and Organized Crime and Vice Division levels was set up for our vice units. This is not to say that problems do not arise in our vice operations, but they are generally detected very early and dealt with effectively. Systemic problems, such as those we encountered in other places, are virtually unheard of in our vice operations. Therefore, we believe it is necessary to emulate those systems for our other critical operational entities where integrity breaches can be far more serious and liability massive.
Priority 7 – FY 00/01
The second Commander position removed from the four geographic bureaus years ago must be restored, along with sufficient sworn and non-sworn staff to allow establishment of a meaningful system of inspections and audits for each of the geographic bureaus. The additional Commander and his/her staff would also assume a portion of the workload currently handled by the single Deputy Chief and Commander in each geographic bureau which typically includes upwards of 2,000 personnel heavily engaged in field activities that represent the greatest risk and liability exposure. As head of the audit team, the requested Commanders would be responsible for overseeing the bureau’s risk management efforts and providing meaningful and regular audits and inspections of the bureau’s operations, including case biopsies and quality control evaluations. Also critical in this effort is the ability to track the implementation of recommendations from previous audits so that a command does not make the same mistakes over and over again. At present, minimum audit team staffing, to be implemented in FY 01/02, has been requested for the geographic Bureaus and Areas. Because some of these commands are larger than others, it will be necessary to review these staffing needs and possibly request additional personnel for the larger commands.
4 – Commanders
4 – Sergeants II
4 – Secretary
Additional Staffing Needs – Subsequent Fiscal Years
4 – Detectives III to head audit and control/review teams in the geographic Bureaus.
18 – Sergeants II to head audit and control/review teams in the geographic Areas.
22 – Police Officers III to staff audit and control/review teams in the geographic Bureaus and Areas.
22 – Management Analysts I to staff audit and control/review teams in the geographic Bureaus and Areas.
22 – Clerk Typists to provide clerical support to geographic Bureau and Area audit and control/review teams.
1 – Lieutenant II to institute an audit function of specialized detective divisions within Operations-Headquarters Bureau (OHB).
12 – Detectives III to institute audit function of specialized detective divisions within OHB.
6 – Sergeants II to institute audit function of specialized detective divisions within OHB.
1 – Senior Clerk Typist to provide clerical support for the above staff.
1 – Detective III to conduct financial checks of employees assigned to specialized detective divisions.
6 – Detectives II to conduct financial checks of employees assigned to supecialized detective divisions.
1 – Clerk Typist to provide clerical support for the above staff.
Priority 8 – FY 00/01
Additional Captains I should be deployed to oversee line operations during the critical evening hours and on weekends to provide management presence at critical incidents. Any municipal police agency’s line operations are most active on weekends and at night where there is currently little oversight by command officers. The Department Commander position was created to partially rectify that shortcoming, but deploying one command or staff officer for the entire City with a 7-day a week around the clock responsibility is insufficient. We must reinstitute the Command Duty Officer program that permanently assigned three full-time Captains to the night hours and on weekends to provide command oversight during those critical hours. However, the program should be expanded to six full-time captains who would report to the Department Commander and provide Citywide coverage from about 1700 hours to 0600 hours Monday through Friday, plus 24-hour coverage on weekends and holidays.
6 – Captains I
Priority 16 – FY 00/01
The ultimate “audit” and the true measure of any law enforcement agency’s effectiveness is the degree to which the community it serves is satisfied with its performance. While we regularly try to take the community’s “temperature” through a variety of means, there simply is no substitute for a well-planned scientific annual survey of the community. In addition to identifying a community’s present concerns, an annual survey allows the Department to measure change within an Area and assess the variables that may have contributed to that change. Most importantly, it also gives the community an opportunity to provide input on Department programs and the way in which community members are being treated. This invaluable information provides insight into potential problems and
allows for early intervention into problem commands. The survey done several years ago by USC is precisely the type of community survey that needs to be done annually in every Area. At an estimated annual cost of about $300,000 each year, this is a cheap investment to ensure that quality police service is being delivered throughout the City.
One of the most common comments expressed by a myriad of people during the Board’s work was how little they knew about some of the Department’s less-than-routine procedures. One good example was the use of informants, where there was near-universal ignorance of our standards and even less comprehension of the dangers inherent in the use of informants.
We also have a fairly young Department and many people promote so rapidly through the supervisory and mid-management ranks that they never have the opportunity to acquire the institutional knowledge which is so critical in those positions. Without the ability to acquire that depth through their own experiences, it simply must be taught to them through training. The unfortunate reality is that Training Group has been forced to move instructors from these critical instruction areas into other learning domains in order to provide those training opportunities. One of those classes is the Tactical Course, which has no authorized complement of officers.
Priority 12 – FY 00/01
Fully staffing the Continuing Education Division Tactics Unit over a two year period will ensure that every officer is adequately trained in this critical risk management area, that remedial training is provided as problems arise, and that every officer receives regular follow-up training throughout their careers. The following FY 00/01 staffing increases have been identified:
1 – Lieutenant II
1 – Sergeant II
6 – Police Officers III
Additional Staffing Needs – FY 01/02
8 – Police Officers III